EVALUACIÓN DOGMÁTICO PENAL DE LA VULNERACIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE PRESUNCIÓN DE INOCENCIA EN EL PROCEDIMIENTO ABREVIADO EN LA LEGISLACIÓN PENAL ECUATORIANA

Abstract

This study conducts a dogmatic analysis of the principle of presumption of innocence within the context of the abbreviated procedure established in the Ecuadorian Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code (COIP). The principle is recognized as a structural guarantee of due process, enshrined in the Constitution and international human rights treaties, and its observance is essential within a guarantor-oriented criminal justice system. However, the practical application of the abbreviated procedure reveals serious tensions with this principle, especially when the defendant’s consent is not entirely free, informed, and voluntary, but rather conditioned by factors such as pretrial detention, lack of adequate legal defense, judicial or social pressure, and judicial system congestion. The research demonstrates that, although the abbreviated procedure is intended to streamline processes and optimize judicial resources, its implementation may result in a form of summary justice that undermines the legitimacy of consent and transforms confession into the main evidentiary basis for conviction. From a dogmatic standpoint, the study questions whether this procedural mechanism complies with the constitutional limits imposed by the presumption of innocence, insofar as it entails implicit self-incrimination and risks nullifying the guarantees of the ordinary criminal trial. The paper also reviews national and international doctrine to support the need for stricter judicial oversight and a constitutionally compliant interpretation that prevents the instrumental use of this legal figure. It concludes that the abbreviated procedure, as currently regulated and applied in Ecuadorian judicial practice, requires critical reassessment to safeguard the fundamental rights of the accused, particularly the presumption of innocence as a core value of modern criminal law.